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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Robin Murray executed a rent-to-own agreement, formally
called a bond for deed contract, for Ingrid Leverett’s house.1 Under the
agreement, Murray would make monthly payments toward the purchase
price, and after completion of the payments, Leverett would transfer title
of the home.2 Sometime before May 2011, Murray fell late on payments;
as a result, Leverett cancelled the contract, evicted Murray’s family, and
filed criminal charges against Murray for stealing the stove, microwave,
and dishwasher.3 Murray claimed that she owned the appliances, which
had stopped functioning, purchased new appliances before her wrongful
eviction, and was waiting for the new appliances to be installed.4 Leverett
countered that Murray had taken the appliances in retaliation for the
eviction.5 Media reports of the trial arguments demonstrate confusion
among the parties and their attorneys regarding each party’s respective
rights and duties under a bond for deed contract.6
Bond for deed contracts can result in situations like Murray’s because
Louisiana law lacks solutions for potential disputes associated with these
contracts.7 For example, if all of the appliances in Leverett’s home were
broken, the statutes and jurisprudence governing bond for deed contracts
would not provide a clear answer as to who would bear the responsibility
of replacing the appliances or whether Murray had the right to replace the
appliances merely because she desired different ones.8 As a result of the
Copyright 2018, by ENDYA L. HASH.
1. Paul Purpura, New Orleans woman convicted of trying to steal appliances
from former landlord, NOLA, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2011/11/robin
_murray_convicted_of_atte.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2011, 6:22 AM) [https://per
ma.cc/9FM7-FPEJ]. This method of financing commonly occurs when the purchaser
cannot obtain a mortgage. Vanessa Richardson, Rent to own homes: When it’s not
time to buy, BANKRATE (Sept. 26, 2016, 1:30 PM) (on file with author).
2. Purpura, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Berthelot v. Le Inv., L.L.C., 866 So. 2d 877, 881 (La. Ct. App.
2004) (providing an example of a court struggling to determine the applicable
law); Lyons v. Pitts, 923 So. 2d 962, 965–66 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
8. Compare Keyes v. Brown, 158 So. 3d 927, 934 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (suggesting
that sellers protect their security interests by requiring purchasers to maintain repairs),
and Montz v. Theard, 818 So. 2d 181, 191 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (suggesting that normal
maintenance expenses are the responsibility of the purchaser), with Regua v. Saucier,
129 So. 3d 798, 801 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (awarding reimbursement for cost of repairs
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deficient law, Murray spent six months in jail.9 Although these agreements
can confuse laypersons, and even attorneys, people continually choose
bond for deed contracts to finance a home when traditional financing
options are not available.10
Most notably, the bursting of the housing bubble in 200811 caused a
banking panic that affected America’s entire financial system and increased
the perceived credit risk throughout the country, causing difficulty for
homebuyers like Murray who are attempting to obtain financing.12 The crash
of the housing market also affected homeowners in record-breaking ways;
foreclosure filings in 2008 were up by 81%,13 and in 2009, 2.8 million
properties received foreclosure notices.14 Damaged personal credit impacted
previous homeowners’ abilities to obtain financing, and the increase in
to purchaser as a matter of equity). Neither the Bond for Deed Act nor the relevant
Civil Code articles illustrate these rights. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 2941–49 (2018); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2623–24 (2018).
9. Purpura, supra note 1.
10. See Bond for Deed, ESCROW SERVS., INC., http://www.escroserv.com/
bond-for-deed.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Q7KC-BLY8].
11. On December 1, 2008, the National Bureau of Economic Research
announced that the economy had entered into a recession in December 2007. Jeff Holt,
A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the Resulting Credit
Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120 (2009). Numerous
commentators have weighed in on the cause of the recession, but many agree that the
main cause likely was the quality of subprime loans that had deteriorated for six
consecutive years before the crisis. Id. Other factors leading to the housing bubble and
credit crisis include low short-term interest rates policy of the federal government,
increased leveraging by investment banks, and increased debt-to-income ratios for
households. Id. at 121. The problems could have been detected long before the crisis,
but they were masked by rapidly rising home prices. Id. at 120.
12. Id. at 120, 127−28. Credit risk refers to the risk that a borrower may not
repay a loan. See id. After the housing bubble burst, lenders were concerned about
the ability of homes to retain value, which may affect the ability of owners to
repay their loans. See id. When major lenders perceive a high credit risk, they are
less likely to lend. See id.
13. Les Christie, Foreclosures up a record 81% in 2008, CNNMONEY (Jan. 15,
2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/15/real_estate/millions_in_foreclosure/ [https:
//perma.cc/U4LR-EK6F].
14. Daren Blomquist, A Record 2.8 Million Properties Receive Foreclosure
Notices in 2009, TAKE2REALESTATE, http://www.take2realestate.com/Record+2.8
+million+properties+receive+foreclosure+notices+in+2009 (last visited Feb. 14, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/9UUT-SHNW]. Some homeowners, who purchased their homes
without making any initial payments immediately before the downturn of the housing
market, simply walked away from homes after prices plummeted. Holt, supra note 11,
at 127.
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foreclosures led to a greater supply of houses on the market, further decreasing
home values.15 This crash in the housing market led to the worst economic
crisis in the United States since the Great Depression.16 Other effects of the
housing crisis, such as greater impoverishment among the middle class, are
still affecting Americans trying to finance homes.17 As a result of the issues
created by the housing crisis, many prospective homebuyers today lack
sufficient resources and the requisite creditworthiness to purchase a home
through the traditional mortgage system.18
Though the negative effects of the housing crisis made the prospect of
home ownership seem impossible to some, willing buyers and sellers continue
to find solutions to financing barriers.19 The increasingly popular bond for
deed contract acts as one such solution.20 In a bond for deed contract, the buyer
pays monthly installments to the seller until the purchase price is satisfied, at
which time the seller transfers title to the buyer.21 Many Louisianans view
these contracts as an alternative to a conventional mortgage.22 In a
conventional mortgage situation, the buyer borrows money to pay the price of
the property upfront.23 The buyer then begins to make payments on her loan.24
The loan is secured by a mortgage on the property, which grants the
mortgagee the right to repossess the property if the buyer stops making
payments on the loan.25 Similarly, in a bond for deed situation, the sale is
financed by the seller, who retains title to the real estate as a form of security
to allow a repossession of the home in the event that the buyer stops paying
the installments.26 The two contracts, however, are fundamentally different
under Louisiana law.27

15. Holt, supra note 11, at 120, 127−28.
16. Id. at 127.
17. Tim Begany, 5 Consequences Of The Mortgage Crisis, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov.
25, 2010), http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/1110/5-consequences-of-themortgage-crisis.aspx [https://perma.cc/GVY3-SMKV].
18. Holt, supra note 11, at 120, 127−28.
19. Richardson, supra note 1; see also ESCROW SERVS., INC., supra note 10.
20. ESCROW SERVS., INC., supra note 10.
21. Richardson, supra note 1.
22. See ‘Bond for Deed’ – A Type of Owner Finance, ST. TAMMANY REAL EST.
INFO., https://sttammanyrealestate.info/2011/04/25/bond-for-deed/ (last visited Feb. 14,
2018) [hereinafter ST. TAMMANY REAL EST. INFO.] [https://perma.cc/4LTY-ZS2F].
23. See DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, SALES § 4:16, in 24
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 150–51 (2012).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See ST. TAMMANY REAL EST. INFO., supra note 22.
27. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:16.
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In Louisiana, specific statutes, jurisprudence, and the Louisiana Civil
Code (“Code”) regulate bond for deed contracts.28 Years ago, Louisiana
courts struggled with importing the bond for deed doctrine, which
originated in the common law, concluding that a sale conditioned on
payment of a price would be contrary to established civilian principles of
the law of sales.29 Transplanting the conditional sale30 from common law
jurisdictions to the mixed jurisdiction of Louisiana has caused uncertainty
as to how bond for deed contracts should be classified—as a sale, contract
to sell, lease, or something else.31 As a result, the bond for deed contract
received sui generis treatment by a special statutory regime, leaving
buyers and sellers largely unprotected and outside the strict regulations of
either a sale or a lease.32 Current law explicitly removes bond for deed
contracts from the legislation pertaining to sales; therefore, the
requirements of the seller’s obligation to deliver,33 warranty against

28. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:2941–49 (2018); see TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING,
supra note 23, § 4:16.
29. Huey L. Golden, The Conditional Sale in Louisiana Jurisprudence:
Anatomy of a Synecdoche, 54 LA. L. REV. 359, 359–60 (1993).
30. A bond for deed contract is a conditional sale of an immovable. Id.
31. See id.
32. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:2941–49; see, e.g., Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St.
Louis Cypress Co., 46 So. 193, 199 (La. 1908) (establishing the rule that a conditional
sale is impossible under Louisiana law).
33. In a typical sale of a home, the seller has the obligation to deliver the
property upon execution of the writing that transfers its ownership. LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2477 (2018). At the moment of delivery, the buyer is entitled to
immediate corporeal possession; therefore, in a typical sale of a home the buyer
can force the seller to move out of the property at the time of closing. Id.; see also,
e.g., Matthews v. Gaubler, 49 So. 2d 774 (La. Ct. App. 1951).
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redhibitory defects,34 or warranty against eviction35 do not apply to bond for
deed contracts.36
Because many bond for deed contracts are created with the assistance of
real estate and escrow agents and without the assistance of an attorney, the
legal community lacks data on how parties rely on these contracts in day-today transactions.37 Additionally, because legal scholars have never
extensively studied the use of these contracts in Louisiana, even they struggle
to discern the practical, as opposed to theoretical, issues with these contracts.38
A study of jurisprudence illustrates the breakdown of contractual relationships
that result in protracted litigation, but a study of the existence and substance
of the contracts outside of litigation is essential to understanding bond for deed
practice. One way to understand what issues the law inadequately addresses
is to examine the actual contracts in the public records and determine the
common usage and intent of the parties. This Comment undertakes such an
examination to reveal what the agreements contain and argues that conditional
sales are not adverse to civilian principles. Rather, a bond for deed contract is
a valid sale that can be fully regulated with the addition of a few articles to the
Civil Code.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of conditional sales in
Louisiana law and describes how parties use bond for deed contracts today.
Part II analyzes research collected on registered bond for deed contracts in
East Baton Rouge Parish to discern the true intent of parties entering bond
for deed contracts and identify whether the existing statutory regime
adequately protects parties. Part III argues that treatment of a bond for deed
34. In a typical sale of a home, the seller has the obligation to warrant against
redhibitory defects in the property, which are hidden defects that exist in the
property at the time of delivery that render the property “useless, . . . its use so
inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not have bought the thing
had he known of the defect[, or] . . . without rendering the thing totally useless, [the
defect] diminishes its usefulness or its value.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2520–21,
2530. Depending on the redhibitory defect, the buyer can have the sale rescinded or
have the price reduced. Id. art. 2541.
35. In a typical sale of a home, the seller has the obligation to warrant against the
buyer’s eviction, which is any loss or danger of losing the property. Id. art. 2500.
Therefore, if a third person reveals a right that is superior to the buyer’s right to the
property, the buyer can withhold the price or rescind the sale. Id. arts. 2557, 2560.
36. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:2941–49; see Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Ecodyne
Corp., 635 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that redhibitory actions are only
available when the underlying transaction is a sale).
37. See Meeting of the Council for the Louisiana State Law Institute (Oct. 29,
1993) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
38. Id. For example, scholars are unaware of the rate at which these contracts
result in an actual transfer of ownership or merely a default and cancellation. Id.
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contract as a sale protects the parties, clarifies applicable law, and gives
effect to the true nature of this contract. The modern bond for deed contract
in Louisiana can become a legitimate means of financing on which buyers,
sellers, and mortgagees can rely.
I. THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN BOND FOR DEED CONTRACT
Modern bond for deed contracts stem from the common law concept
of a conditional sale or a sale in which the seller reserves title until the
performance of a condition.39 Although Louisiana originally rejected the
conditional sale, courts ultimately came to understand the conditional
sale’s utility and carved out methods of enforcing these contracts in the
context of real estate transactions.40 Unfortunately, the resulting legal
regime leaves practitioners with little guidance regarding the effects of
modern bond for deed contracts.
In both the common and civil law systems, a contract forms the law of
the parties, so the main objective of contract interpretation is to determine
the parties’ intent.41 With this objective, common law courts interpret
conditional sales to have the same effects as absolute sales in every respect
except one: the seller reserves title until the performance of a condition,
usually payment of the price.42 Therefore, common law courts always have
39. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:16.
40. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 46 So. 193, 199 (La.
1908) (holding that conditional sales are impossible under the Civil Code); Trichel
v. Home Ins. Co., 99 So. 403, 404 (La. 1924) (holding that conditional sales are
only impossible when selling movables).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2045 (2018); Chi. Mill & Lumber Co. v. Lewis, 68 So. 2d 913,
917 (La. Ct. App. 1953); Brun-Chaix, Inc., v. Abadie, 14 Teiss. 89, 91 (La. Ct. App.
1916); Kennedy v. Saheid, 209 So. 3d 985, 991 (La. Ct. App. 2016); Gaspard v.
Safeway Ins. Co., 202 So. 3d 1128, 1132 (La. Ct. App. 2016); Green ex rel. Peterson
v. Johnson, 149 So. 3d 766, 770 (La. 2014); Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 148 So.
3d 888, 892 (La. 2014).
42. In re Robinson, 40 F. Supp. 320, 323 (E.D. Penn. 1941), aff’d, 122 F.2d 336
(3d Cir. 1941); Cownie v. Local Bd. of Review in and for Des Moines, 16 N.W.2d
592 (Iowa 1944). This agreement effectively creates something similar to a traditional
mortgage in the common law because there is a purchaser paying monthly
installments and upon the purchaser’s default the person to whom the installments are
being paid will own and repossess the home. There are, however, many reasons why
parties across the United States may choose these conditional sales arrangements over
traditional mortgages, such as default rules regarding rights, tax schemes, and
regulatory rules regarding recordation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
MORTGAGES § 3.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1997); see Goodrich v. Nat’l Guarantee &
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recognized these sales and continue to hold the parties’ intent above all
else.43
As in the common law, Louisiana contracts form the law of the parties,
and intent is paramount.44 Unlike the common law, however, the Louisiana
Civil Code controls Louisiana contract interpretation, and the intention of the
parties cannot contradict certain imperative rules provided by the Code.45
Louisiana courts continue to hold that conditional sales cannot be reconciled
with the Civil Code provisions on sales, and the parties’ intentions cannot
override the basic tenet that a bond for deed contract is not a sale in
Louisiana.46 Despite negative court treatment, parties continue to create bond
for deed agreements.47 After the courts attempted to address the contracts
through jurisprudence alone, the Louisiana Legislature (“Legislature”)
intervened.48
A. Jurisprudence
In early jurisprudence, the Louisiana Supreme Court enforced conditional
sales according to the parties’ intent without hesitation.49 In Baldwin v. Young,
the Court held that a conditional sale in which the purchaser had not paid the
price was enforceable according to the parties’ intent, meaning that the seller
could reclaim the thing sold.50 In Baldwin, the seller sold a heater, and the
purchaser installed the heater into a seminary.51 The mortgagee of the building
in which the heater was installed eventually foreclosed on the property and
sold the land and buildings at a sheriff’s sale.52 The seller of the heater then
Fin. Co., 36 N.E.2d 435 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940); Joseph E. Tierney, Jr., Security—
Conditional Sale—Distinction Between Mortgage and Conditional Sale, 24 MARQ. L.
REV. 224, 225 (1940).
43. See, e.g., Stroup v. Myers, 21 N.E.2d 75 (Ind. App. 1939).
44. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2045; Chi. Mill & Lumber Co., 68 So. 2d at 917;
Brun-Chaix, Inc., 14 Teiss. at 91; Kennedy, 209 So. 3d at 991; Gaspard, 202 So.
3d at 1132; Green, 149 So. 3d at 770; Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 892.
45. Art. 2045.
46. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Safeway Ins. Co., 787 So. 2d 1182, 1190 (La. Ct. App.
2001) (Saunders, J., dissenting) (citing Sec. Ctr. Prot. Servs., Inc. v. All–Pro Sec.,
Inc., 703 So. 2d 806 (La. Ct. App. 1997)); Guste v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 655 So.
2d 724, 732 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Belle Pass Terminal, Inc. v. Jolin, Inc., 634 So.
2d 466, 489–90 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
47. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:16.
48. See id.
49. See Baldwin v. Young, 17 So. 883 (La. 1895).
50. Id. at 883.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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sought to enjoin the new owner of the building and reclaim the heater. 53
The Court found that the heater was sold to the building’s previous owner
under a contract whereby ownership of the heater remained with the seller
until the purchaser paid the price.54 Thus, when the former building owner
failed to pay, the ownership of the thing remained with the seller and did
not transfer to the mortgage creditor under foreclosure.55 The Court then
stated that “there is no controversy on the issue of . . . ownership of the
heater. It belongs to the vendor under his conditional sale.”56 The 1895
Baldwin Court recognized a conditional sale of a movable as possible and
stated that ownership remained with the seller until the price was paid.57
Thirteen years after the decision in Baldwin, the Court held that
conditional sales were impossible under the Civil Code in Barber Asphalt
Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co.58 In this case, the parties contracted
for the conditional sale of a steam shovel, according to which the buyer
would pay for the shovel over time and, after paying in full, the seller
would convey title.59 The Court found that conditional sales are
“impossible” under Louisiana’s civil law for three reasons: (1) transfer of
ownership is requisite to a sale; (2) a sale cannot be subject to a suspensive
condition of payment; and (3) sales require that the price exists.60 First, the
Court found that an immediate transfer of ownership was necessary in
order for a sale to have the mutuality of obligations necessary in any
onerous contract.61 The Court found that requiring one obligor to perform
payment of the price while the other obligor did not need to perform the
transfer of ownership created an inherently unfair contract that could not
be enforced.62 According to the Court, although payment of the price can
be delayed in any sale, transfer of ownership cannot be delayed.63 Second,
the Court found that this contract could not be considered as having a
suspensive condition of payment because a true suspensive condition

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 884.
57. Id.
58. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 46 So. 193 (La. 1908).
59. Id. at 193.
60. Id. at 199. This Comment argues in Part III that this interpretation of the
Civil Code is inaccurate.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (“In a case like the present, the owner either parts with ownership, i.e.,
makes a sale; or he promises to part with it upon payment of the price, i.e., makes
a promise of sale.”).
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suspends the existence of the contract.64 In this case, both parties conceded
that they intended for a contract to exist before the occurrence of the
condition; therefore, this occurrence was certainly not a suspensive
condition to the sale.65 Third, the Court found that the price must exist to
effect a sale, and a sale in which the price does not yet exist cannot possibly
be enforced.66
Using this rationale, the Court determined that ownership of the steam
shovel passed to the buyer at the time of formation of the contract.67
Therefore, the contract was enforceable but not according to the intent of the
parties, namely that the transfer of ownership be delayed.68 The result of this
holding is that Barber Asphalt Paving Co. had not stated a cause of action and
the trial court properly dismissed the case.69 Although the subject of intense
scholarly criticism,70 the holding regarding the impossibility of a conditional
sale in the Code indisputably is the law.71 The object of the contract in Barber
Asphalt was a movable thing,72 and the Court was not sympathetic to Barber
Asphalt Paving Co.’s loss of ownership of the movable.73 The Court,
however, had a difficult time dismissing the action when faced with a contract
regarding immovable property.74
In Trichel v. Home Insurance Co., the Court determined that the
prohibition on conditional sales does not apply to immovable property, but
64. Id. (“[T]he sale cannot have been under a suspensive condition; since a sale of
that kind has no effect or operation, and the present sale had an effect or operation . . . .”).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. See Golden, supra note 29; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23,
§ 4:16; SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS, BOOK 2 § 65, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 96 (2012); F. Hodge O’Neal, The Conditional Sale in Louisiana, 2 LA. L.
REV. 338, 339 (1940).
71. See Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., 99 So. 403, 404 (La. 1924) (allowing these
contracts to act as contracts to sell when the object is the sale of an immovable).
Although these contracts are incompatible with the Civil Code, the legislative
response has been to enact the Louisiana Lease of Movables Act, which allows
movables to be leased to own and gives effect to contracts that would have been
classified as impossible conditional sales before the legislation. See LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 9:3301−42 (2018).
72. Generally, tracts of land, with their buildings, are immovables, and all
other things are movables. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 462, 474 (2018).
73. See Barber Asphalt, 46 So. 193.
74. Trichel, 99 So. at 404. Generally, tracts of land, with their buildings, are
immovables. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 462, 474.
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the contract itself could not result in a change of title or interest in the
property.75 In Trichel, the parties effectively created a conditional sale of
a home but fashioned their agreement as a contract to sell, which grants a
right to specific performance.76 Before the act of sale was completed, a fire
destroyed the house, and the seller’s insurance company refused to cover
the incident because the seller’s policy contained a clause providing that
the entire policy “shall be void . . . if the interest of the insured be other
than unconditional and sole ownership . . . or if any change . . . take place
in the interest, title or possession of the subject of insurance.”77 The
company argued that the conditional sale had constituted a change of title
or interest that would trigger this policy provision.78 The Court found that
the contract had not operated as a change of title or interest because the
contract was merely a contract to sell, not a deed translative of title.79
The Court recognized the existence of the Barber Asphalt bar to
conditional sales but provided a unique method of circumventing this
prohibition in the context of immovable property.80 The Court first
distinguished a sale of movable property from a sale of immovable property
by noting that movable property can be sold by mere consent, whereas
immovable property can be sold only by a deed translative of title.81 Thus,
because the parties intended to create a deed translative of title in a
subsequent contract, the Court found that the contract was not a sale of
immovable property but was a contract to sell.82 Using this distinction, the
Court found that a promise to sell immovable property did not constitute a
completed sale; instead, a promise granted a right to specific performance
75. Trichel, 99 So. at 404.
76. Id. at 403. As a preliminary matter, the difference between contracts to
sell and contracts of sale must be clear. Contracts of sale constitute a sale within
themselves, and all of the effects of a sale, such as transfer of ownership and
payment of the price, will follow. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2439. In contracts to
sell, the parties are agreeing to enter into a sale later. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2623. Usually the subsequent contract of sale will be conditioned on uncertain
events. Art. 2623. The most common contract to sell is a purchase agreement
when buying a house. These agreements contemplate that parties will enter into
an official contract of sale upon the conditions that purchasers secure financing
and inspect the home, among others. The effects of a sale do not flow from a
contract to sell, but if the conditions are met, a contract to sell forces the parties
to enter into a contract of sale at a later date. Art. 2623.
77. Trichel, 99 So. at 403.
78. Id. at 404.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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of a sale.83 Because no title transferred, ownership did not change hands,
and the insurance policy was not void.84 Once again, the Court found the
contract enforceable but not according to the intent of the parties, which
was to have a sale in which transfer of ownership was delayed. 85 Like
Barber Asphalt, Trichel is also susceptible to severe criticism.86
After Trichel, one of the biggest problems courts faced was the nature
of the right obtained by the purchaser in a bond for deed contract, if any.
The Louisiana Supreme Court established in Levine v. First National Bank
of Commerce that a purchaser in a bond for deed arrangement obtains an
interest in the property.87 In Levine, the seller had mortgaged the property,
and the mortgage continued to exist after the execution of the bond for
deed contract with the purchaser.88 The seller’s mortgage contained a
“due-on-sale” clause, stating, “If . . . the Property or any interest in it is
sold or transferred . . . without [mortgagee]’s prior written consent,
[mortgagee] may . . . require immediate payment in full of all sums secured
by this Security Instrument.”89 The Court had to determine whether the
bond for deed contract, which lacked approval by the mortgagee, triggered
the due-on-sale clause in the seller’s mortgage.90 The Court held that the
conveyance of rights in the bond for deed contract sufficiently triggered
the due-on-sale clause of the mortgage.91 The Court interpreted the bond
for deed’s designation as a contract to sell as granting the purchaser the
right to demand specific performance, namely, the transfer of the title upon
the conclusion of the term of the parties’ contract and the right of
immediate and exclusive possession of the property.92 Because the
83. Id. In other words, a contract to sell does not result in the transfer of property;
the contract instead results in the legal right to demand the other party complete the
sale at a later time. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2623 (2018); Stumpf v. Richardson, 748
So. 2d 1225 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Thompson v. Thompson, 30 So. 2d 321 (La. 1947).
84. Trichel, 99 So. at 405.
85. See id.
86. Scholars often note that the Civil Code allows for the sale of immovables
by consent—without a written document—when the immovable is actually
delivered and the transferor recognizes the transfer. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1839.
Therefore, the distinction drawn by the Court is not accurate. See TOOLEYKNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:22, at 193−95; Golden, supra note 29,
at 359; LITVINOFF, supra note 70, § 65; O’Neal, supra note 70, at 359.
87. Levine v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 948 So. 2d 1051, 1059 (La. 2006).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1058.
90. Id. at 1054. The Levine Court also considered questions of federal law,
but these questions are outside the scope of this Comment. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1058−59, 1059 n.8.

2018]

COMMENT

1301

language of the contract did not require the Court to determine whether a
real right in the property was transferred, the Court specifically avoided
addressing the issue, and the law on that point remains uncertain.93
Therefore, although the Court answered a few questions related to the
enforcement and validity of these contracts, the Court left many other
questions regarding the nature of the contract unanswered.
Construing a bond for deed agreement as a contract to sell gives the
contract effect without overruling Barber Asphalt or classifying the
contract as a sale.94 Nevertheless, the Court did not address any other
effects of the contract beyond the right to specific performance.95 This
recognition of bond for deed contracts left the legal community uncertain
regarding the rights and obligations of the parties, such as the seller’s
obligation to deliver, warrant against redhibitory defects, and warrant
against eviction.96
B. Legislation
Recognizing the need for clarification, the Louisiana Legislature
passed the Bond for Deed Act in 1934 to recognize and regulate
conditional sales of immovables.97 Although the statute successfully
regulated some areas surrounding the bond for deed, the statute failed to
resolve many issues facing the parties to bond for deed contracts and, in
fact, created several additional problems.98 The Act defines a bond for
deed contract as “a contract to sell real property, in which the purchase
price is to be paid by the buyer to the seller in installments and in which
the seller after payment of a stipulated sum agrees to deliver title to the
buyer.”99 Civilian scholars continuously critique the Bond for Deed Act’s
inaccurate designation of the contract as a “contract to sell.”100 This
93. See id. at 1058–59.
94. Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., 99 So. 403 (La. 1924).
95. See id.
96. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:16, at 160.
97. The Legislature listed the following central objectives of the Act: (1)
regulate the execution of agreements; (2) regulate agreements on mortgaged
property; (3) require parties to provide payments to an escrow agent regulating
the foreclosure of mortgages; (4) allow for cancellation for non-performance; and
(5) define a bond for deed contract. Act No. 169, 1934 La. Acts 544−45.
98. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:16, at 160.
99. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2941 (2018).
100. See, e.g., David Levingston, Bond for Deed Contract, 31 LA. L. REV. 587
(1971); TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:16, at 160; O’Neal,
supra note 70, at 339. The bond for deed contract is not properly classified as a
contract to sell because the contract requires the parties to fulfill the obligations
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provision codifies the holding in Trichel and continues to restrict these
contracts without clearly establishing the seller’s obligation to deliver,
warrant against redhibitory defects, or warrant against eviction. Civil law
jurisdictions outside of Louisiana have classified this contract as a sale,101
and Louisiana’s statutory designation undermines the intent of the parties
and neglects more appropriate civilian interpretations.102 Although the
distinction may seem semantic, whether the contract is considered a sale—
as opposed to a contract to sell—seriously affects the rights of the
parties.103 The frequency at which parties participate in sales transactions
without the assistance of an attorney forces sales law to provide a
comprehensive suppletive law, which discerns the rights and obligations
of parties when they neglect to include a provision in their contract.104
Because these contracts are classified as contracts to sell, suppletive sales
law cannot apply and parties are protected only by articles on conventional
obligations and “[o]bligations in [g]eneral.”105
The Act also attempts to regulate how bond for deed contracts operate
when a mortgage encumbers the property.106 The Louisiana Legislature
provides provisions that help buyers avoid eviction by mortgagees by
following certain statutory safeguards, such as designation of an escrow
agent to assure the buyer properly forwards payments to the mortgagee.107
The adequacy of these protections is questionable because courts have not
always required strict adherence to the specifications set forth in the Act.108
The Bond for Deed Act also purports to protect buyers from issues
created by the uncertainty regarding the nature of their rights in the
contained in the contract of sale, namely to pay the price of the thing and deliver the
thing. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2439, 2475, 2549, 2623, 2624 (2018). The
Trichel Court’s characterization of these contracts as contracts to sell was a mere
artifice designed to allow the court to uphold the contract and not a theoretically
sound interpretation of the Civil Code. See O’Neal, supra note 70, at 339.
101. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Cuba all classify these contracts as
sales. Agustin Cruz, The Validity of the Conditional Sale in Civil Law, 4 TUL. L.
REV. 531, 565–69 (Deutsche O’Neal trans., 1930).
102. Id.; see also O’Neal, supra note 70, at 339.
103. See, e.g., Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., 99 So. 403, 405 (La. 1924) (determining
ownership affected whether insurance covered the burning of the home); St. Landry
Loan Co. v. Etienne, 227 So. 2d 599, 599–600 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (determining
status as sale affected whether home was subject to mortgage foreclosure).
104. See Hoffman F. Fuller, Certainty of Promise in the Law of Sale, 30 TUL.
L. REV. 568, 574 (1956).
105. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2438−39.
106. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:2941−47.
107. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:23, at 196.
108. Id.
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property. Whether a bond for deed contract grants a real right in the
property greatly affects the purchaser’s rights with respect to third
parties.109 A real right is a right that is enforceable against the world, as
opposed to a personal right that is only good against a particular party.110
Currently, the law hints at the creation of a real right by a bond for deed
contract, but there is no official affirmation.111 The Louisiana Legislature
amended the Bond for Deed Act in 2006 to provide a purchaser in a bond
for deed contract the same protection under the public records doctrine that
an actual sale confers to a buyer.112 The statute provides, “Upon the
recordation . . . of a bond for deed contract . . . any sale, contract,
counterletter, lease, or mortgage executed by the bond for deed seller, and
any lien, privilege, or judgment . . . that has not been filed previously for
registry . . . shall be subject to the rights created by the bond for deed
contract.”113 Typically, rules of recordation apply to real rights in
immovable property.114 There still is no explicit establishment of a real
right in a bond for deed contract, and providing the benefits of recordation
does not establish a real right.115
Moreover, the Bond for Deed Act of 1934 has remained largely
ignored by the Louisiana Legislature since its enactment almost 83 years
ago.116 The few minor amendments to the Act made during that interim
have failed to address the major issues regarding the rights and obligations
of parties involved in bond for deed contracts.117 The provisions only
address certain issues related to mortgages that are rarely enforced and fail

109. See Edward C. Abell, Jr., Real Right in Louisiana, 21 LA. L. REV. 462 (1961).
110. Id. at 462−63.
111. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2941.1.
112. See Act No. 582, 2006 La. Acts 2168; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING,
supra note 23, § 4:24; § 9:2941.1.
113. § 9:2941.1(A) (2006).
114. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1839 (2018) (“An instrument involving
immovable property shall have effect against third persons only from the time it
is filed for registry.”).
115. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2941–49 (2018); Meeting of the Council for
the Louisiana State Law Institute, at 4 (Dec. 17, 1993) (on file with the Louisiana
State Law Institute).
116. In 1999, the cancellation provision was altered to allow for service of notice
of cancellation upon the buyer by certified mail. Act No. 517, 1999 La. Acts 1733.
In 2006, § 9:2941.1 was added to prohibit interest for subsequent filing by or against
the bond for deed purchaser and provide for the cancellation of certain mortgage
records after registry of the sale. Act No. 582, 2006 La. Acts 2168.
117. See Act No. 517, 1999 La. Acts 1733; Act No. 582, 2006 La. Acts 2168.
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to alleviate the uncertainty created in the jurisprudence regarding the
applicability of buyer protections found in sales law.118
C. Study and Failed Reform
Although largely unchanged since 1934, the Bond for Deed Act was
the subject of close study and consideration in 1993 when the Legislature
requested that the Louisiana State Law Institute (“Law Institute”) 119
recommend appropriate reform.120 Though the Louisiana Legislature did
not adopt its final proposal, the Law Institute’s Bond for Deed committee
discussed the importance of bond for deed contracts in Louisiana by
identifying its financial and social benefits as well as discussing pitfalls of
the provisions.121
The committee first considered whether bond for deed contracts
should be abolished, and it quickly concluded that the financial advantages
of bond for deed contracts militate against abolition.122 Their advantages123
meant that, although sellers had occasionally abused the bond for deed
system,124 most professional developers found the contract helpful in the
realm of residential housing and even more successful than mortgages in
certain situations.125 The committee also concluded that, aside from the
financial benefits of properly regulated bond for deed contracts, there is a
public interest in the law bringing together parties who wish to participate
in sales of immovables and in facilitating those transactions.126 Having
been assured of the social and financial utility of these contracts, the
118. Golden, supra note 29, at 372–73.
119. “The Louisiana State Law Institute . . . was chartered, created and organized
as an official law revision commission, law reform agency and legal research agency
of the State of Louisiana, by Act 166 of the Legislature of 1938 . . . .” LA. STATE LAW
INST. (Dec. 15, 1977), http://www.lsli.org/foreword [https://perma.cc/EM5W-WUPQ].
120. H.R. Res. 246, Reg. Sess. (La. 1993).
121. See, e.g., Meeting of the Council for the Louisiana State Law Institute
(Dec. 17, 1993) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
122. Meeting of the Council for the Louisiana State Law Institute, at 5−6 (Oct.
29, 1993) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
123. These advantages include reduction of foreclosure costs, the financing of
a sale by people who are willing to take the risk without the intervention of a bank,
and savings on closing costs. Id.
124. Sellers have been accused of taking advantage of buyers who made
payments and subsequently defaulted, gaining no equity in the property. Id.
125. Meeting of the Council for the Louisiana State Law Institute, at 4 (Dec.
17, 1993) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
126. Meeting of the Council for the Louisiana State Law Institute, at 2−3 (Feb.
18, 1994) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
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committee attempted to propose a regime that would adequately protect
buyers and aid these transactions.127
The committee’s final proposal classifies a bond for deed contract as
a sui generis contract.128 The proposal replaces the Bond for Deed Act with
a series of 14 articles that retain the basic import of the current act while
solving the biggest problems.129 The most important features of the
proposal were the contract’s classification as a sui generis contract,
granting of a real right for the buyer in the immovable, and application of
the law of eviction.130 No documentation exists explaining the
Legislature’s rejection of the Law Institute’s final proposal.
The housing crisis’s effects have only increased the need for the
reform of Louisiana’s bond for deed system.131 One escrow service
revealed that it services hundreds of bond for deed contracts per year in
Louisiana.132 Considering that not all bond for deed contracts require
escrow services,133 and that other escrow services operate in the state,134
these contracts potentially affect thousands of Louisianans. Despite
widespread use, the statutory classification of these contracts as “contracts
to sell” as opposed to “contracts of sale” fails to express the intent of the
parties and instead leaves purchasers and sellers unprotected.135 When the
committee of the Law Institute met in 1993 to discuss these contracts, the
committee members heard several opinions of professional realtors but did
not perform an empirical analysis of these contracts—nor did they uncover
data concerning contractual provisions.136 Since that time, there have been
no attempts to understand the use of bond for deed contracts in practice or
empirically break down their provisions.137

127. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach (Sept. 19,
1994) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. ESCROW SERVS., INC., supra note 10.
132. E-mail from Escrow Services, Inc. (Oct. 4, 2016, 14:54 CST) (on file with
author).
133. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2943 (2018) (“All payments . . . under bond for deed
contracts of property then or thereafter burdened with a mortgage . . . shall be
made to some . . . escrow agent.”).
134. This information can be found via a Google search for “escrow services
bond for deed Louisiana.”
135. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:16, at 160.
136. See Meetings of the Council for the Louisiana State Law Institute (on file
with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
137. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:16, at 160.
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II. WHAT ARE WE GETTING OURSELVES INTO?: HOW PARTIES USE
BOND FOR DEED CONTRACTS
To comprehend what parties intend to accomplish by using bond for
deed contracts, and to understand how parties fail to protect themselves,
analyzing registered contracts in the mortgage and conveyance records of
East Baton Rouge Parish is essential.138 A study of the contracts actually
used by parties illustrates the accuracy of the civil law scholars’ critiques
and the existence of any additional aspects of the parties’ relationship that
should be specifically regulated in the statutory regime. This study reveals
what real estate practitioners, as well as contracting parties, understand the
main issues to be in these types of arrangements.
A. Methodology
To gain an understanding of the basic provisions that parties have
included in bond for deed contracts, research methodology included a
review of 117 contracts, dating from 2014 to 2016, on file in the mortgage
and conveyance records at the East Baton Rouge Parish Clerk of Court’s
Office.139 The method employed in conducting this study was the
following process: all contracts from 2014 to 2016 were read for major
similarities and differences; contracts filed within a year from the research
date then were read carefully; and the type of provisions included in each
contract was catalogued.140 Analysis of this data identified trends in the
types of provisions parties are using, altering, or neglecting on these
contracts.141 Evidence of the contracts’ origins and the contracts’ authors
was also collected. The vast majority of parties used two different generic
or “form” contracts.142 For ease of discussion, these forms are referred to
as “Form A” and “Form B.”143 The few remaining contracts that were not
identified as either Form A or Form B were each composed of unique
provisions, although many of these provisions were similar to Form B.144
Form A is used in 19% of registered bond for deed contracts and
consists of a memorandum of a bond for deed contract created by Escrow
138. Analyzing a defined set of registered contracts was essential. The author
chose East Baton Rouge for obvious convenience.
139. See infra Appendix B.
140. Id. The contracts that were read carefully for information on specific
provisions included contracts filed from September 2015 through August 2016.
141. Id.
142. See infra Appendix A.
143. See infra Appendix B (providing copies of these common contract forms).
144. See infra Appendix B.
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Services, Inc., an escrow company that professes to service these
contracts.145 Form A includes provisions that create a special mortgage on
the property to allow the purchaser to secure the seller’s obligations under
the agreement; allow the escrow agent to file a cancellation if payment
records show default or breach of other obligations as determined by the
escrow agent; create a usufruct on the property for the purchaser; and grant
the escrow agency “power of attorney” for matters relating to the bond for
deed agreement.146
The majority of the registered contracts are Form B, a fill-in-the-blank
form easily found online.147 Form B, used in 74% of registered contracts,
includes substantially longer provisions than Form A and covers a broad
range of issues from the terms of the future sale to liquidated damages,
which are discussed below.148
B. Secrets Revealed
Although the registered contracts provide many interesting provisions
for discussion, the most pressing issues are the risk of loss and repairs and
the rights of the purchaser as to third parties.149
1. Risk of Loss and Repairs
Risk of loss or destruction of property because of a fortuitous event is
concerning in contracts of this nature, and provisions addressing the risk
of loss place the burden of covering any damage on a certain party. 150
Interestingly, none of the registered contracts specifically addressed which
party assumes the risk of loss or destruction of the original property; 59%
of the contracts, however, stipulated that the purchaser assumes the risk of
loss or destruction of any improvements.151 If these parties intended the
purchaser to bear the risk of loss in the original property also, a simpler
drafting of the provision would have merely stated that the purchaser
assumed the risk of loss of all property subject to the bond for deed
145. Id.; ESCROW SERVS., INC., supra note 10. See, e.g., infra Appendix A.
146. See infra Appendix A.
147. See infra Appendix B. This information can be found via a Google search
for “Louisiana Bond for Deed Contracts.” The file is automatically downloaded
and does not appear to be housed on any website in particular.
148. See infra Appendices A, B.
149. See infra Appendix A.
150. See Meeting of the Council for the Louisiana State Law Institute, at 2
(Dec. 17, 1993) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
151. See infra Appendix B.
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contract, including improvements. Because parties opted for the more
complex construction of the provision, the drafting suggests a contrario
the purchaser is not taking the risk of loss of the original property. An
interpretation of the plain language152 of the registered contracts suggests
that the sellers are continuing to assume the risk of loss of the principal
property.153
Furthermore, 29% of the registered contracts dictated purchaser
responsibility for repairs and 59% established purchaser responsibility for
“upkeep” of the property.154 The inclusion of these specific provisions
once again implies that, without such provisions, responsibility belongs to
the seller.155 Shifting these obligations to the purchaser has serious
implications that parties may not foresee. For example, should injury occur
because of the property being poorly tended, the law does not provide
whether the buyer or seller is responsible for those injuries.156 The seller
may be able to use this provision to shift some amount of tort liability to
the purchaser by arguing that the purchaser contractually accepted the duty
to keep the premises safe for visitors and occupants.157
The law of conventional obligations, unlike the law of sales, provides
no clear explanation of liability should the property be destroyed or require
significant repair.158 For example, the sales articles provide that risk of loss
generally transfers from the seller to the buyer at the time of delivery and
that the seller warrants that the thing sold is fit for the thing’s intended
use.159 These provisions apply only to contracts classified as sales, and the
categorization of a bond for deed contract as a contract to sell results in an
inability to apply these protective default provisions.160
2. Rights of the Purchaser as to Third Parties
The registered contracts completely neglect to address the rights of
purchasers with respect to third parties that may hold rights related to the

152. The Civil Code dictates that contracts should be interpreted using the
generally prevailing meaning of words, or the plain language. LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2047 (2018).
153. See infra Appendix A.
154. See infra Appendix B.
155. See infra Appendix B.
156. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:16, at 160.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2467, 2475, 2492 (2018).
159. Arts. 2467, 2475.
160. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2438.
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property.161 A provision of this nature would explain the purchaser’s right
as to judgments against the property when the purchaser is not at fault,
such as if a creditor obtains a judgment to seize the seller’s assets.162 The
registered contracts provide no legal protection for the purchasers
regarding their rights relative to third parties; therefore, applicable default
laws are necessary.163
This issue has arisen at least once in litigation.164 Recall the Louisiana
Supreme Court case Levine v. First National Bank of Commerce. In
Levine, the seller mortgaged the property, and that mortgage continued to
exist after the bond for deed was executed.165 The Court had to determine
whether the bond for deed contract, which lacked approval by the
mortgagee, triggered the due-on-sale clause in the seller’s mortgage.166
The Court held that the conveyance of rights in the bond for deed contract
sufficiently triggered the due-on-sale clause of the mortgage.167 Because
the language of the contract did not require the Court to determine whether
a real right in the property was transferred, the Court specifically avoided
addressing the issue.168
Parties are unable to contract for every situation, and their contracts
do not provide stipulations for every contingency.169 Because so many of
these contracts are entered into in Louisiana170 and because the contracts
involve the sale of immovable things, public policy requires more
comprehensive default rules to protect both primary parties and third
parties.171

161. See infra Appendix A.
162. Meeting of the Council for the Louisiana State Law Institute, at 4 (Dec.
17, 1993) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
163. See infra Appendix A.
164. See, e.g., Levine v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 948 So. 2d 1051 (La. 2006).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1054. Questions of federal law were also considered in this case but
are outside the scope of this Comment. See id.
167. Id. at 1066.
168. Id.
169. See N. Stephan Kinsella, Smashing the Broken Mirror: The Battle of the Forms,
UCC 2-207, and Louisiana’s Improvements, 53 LA. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (1993).
170. E-mail from Escrow Services, Inc. (Oct. 4, 2016, 14:54 CST) (on file with
author).
171. Professor J. Denson Smith regarded the Bond for Deed Act as
“recogniz[ing] that purchasers under such contracts are generally not as well
informed as are sellers nor, consequently, as qualified to protect themselves against
sharp practices, and [the Act] is aimed at giving them a degree of protection that
their situations demand.” Farthing v. Neely, 129 So. 2d 224, 238 n.4 (La. Ct. App.
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C. Conclusions
The totality of the circumstances surrounding these transactions
reveals that this representation of the bond for deed contract as a contract
to sell does not accurately embody the parties’ intentions.172 The fact that
93% of these contracts are form contracts easily found online and filled
with boilerplate language, combined with representations by escrow and
real estate agents, reveal that the parties approach bond for deed contracts
as they would any other sale of real estate.173 The parties intend for this
transaction to result in a sale of the property in every respect except one:
the transfer of title will be delayed. The ready availability of this standard
contract online, however, may induce an erroneous assumption that the
form contract fully protects both parties’ interests.174
Furthermore, the types of provisions the parties include in these
contracts relate to things the parties know that owners do, such as pay taxes
and pay for homeowner’s insurance.175 Parties realize that if title does not
transfer the seller would be on the hook still for taxes and insurance, and
parties make clear that although this is the case, the premiums and taxes
will be paid by the buyer to the seller to compensate for this cost.176 Again,
the inclusion of provisions that would alter these responsibilities indicates
that parties intend for this to be a sale in every way, except for the delay
of ownership. Parties are thinking about the major consequences of
withholding title that they consider important without realizing other legal
consequences, such as opting out of the default sales provisions of the
Civil Code, such as the seller’s obligations of delivery, warranty against
redhibitory defects, and warranty against eviction.
Escrow service providers filing these agreements advertise on their
websites that rent-to-own contracts are an easier and cheaper method of
selling a home than a traditional mortgage.177 Sellers and purchasers rely
on the escrow agent’s representation that the contract is a sale even though
this understanding is not always memorialized in the contract the parties

1961). The recordation provision in the Act provides a ranking scheme to protect
the buyer vis-á-vis third parties. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2941.1 (2018).
172. Infra Appendix A.
173. See infra Appendix B.
174. See, e.g., Kinsella, supra note 169, at 1557 (discussing the use of form
contracts and the difficulty in their interpretation).
175. See infra Appendix B.
176. See infra Appendix B.
177. ESCROW SERVS., INC., supra note 10.
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sign.178 This confusion creates an even greater divide between the
classification of the contract and its practical use.
Leaving the regulation of a contract that concerns the sale of an
immovable to articles on conventional obligations and obligations in
general ignores the specific needs of the parties.179 The Louisiana
Legislature acknowledged that fact early in the history of bond for deed
contracts in Louisiana by passing the Bond for Deed Act in 1934, which
was intended to provide a body of suppletive law separate from sales.180
The registered contracts reveal, however, that parties would be more
adequately protected if the contract was treated as a sale and buyers and
sellers were subject to all of the rights and obligations of parties to a sale,
such as seller’s obligations to deliver, warrant against redhibitory defects,
and warrant against eviction.181
III. HOW TO FIX THE BOND FOR DEED PROBLEM
Understanding the problem with the lack of protection for parties to a
bond for deed contract, potential solutions include amending the Bond for
Deed Act or designating the contract as a sale. It is necessary to examine
first whether classifying these contracts as a sale is a possibility, then
whether this option is preferable to simply amending the Bond for Deed
Act, and finally, how the Civil Code and Bond for Deed Act should be
altered to protect these parties.
Surveying the various issues raised by the obscurity in the law
regulating bond for deed contracts reveals that the comprehensive law of
sales would resolve many uncertainties and diminish the need for the
current Bond for Deed Act. The issues exacerbated by the Act and
identified by Louisiana jurisprudence and the registered contracts can be
solved with a simple Civil Code revision to protect parties in situations
common to the law of sales.182
178. Infra Appendix A.
179. A conventional obligation is a term used by the Civil Code that means
contract. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1906 (2018). “Obligations in general” refers
to the body of law in the Civil Code that regulates all types of obligations, which
are legal relationships whereby a person is bound to render a performance in favor
of another. See id. art. 1756 (2018).
180. Act. No. 169, 1934 La. Acts 544.
181. See, e.g., Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, art. 8 (Sept.
19, 1994) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute) (“When a third person holds
a right to the property superior to the grantor’s the rights of the grantee are governed
by the provisions of the Civil Code governing eviction in the law of sales.”).
182. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1915−16.
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A. Barber Asphalt’s Blunders: Possibility of Conditional Sales in the
Civil Code
For almost a century, Louisiana has refused to consider the possibility
of a sale in which transfer of ownership is conditioned on payment of the
purchase price.183 This refusal stems from a line of jurisprudence that
begins with the landmark holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Barber Asphalt, determining that a conditional sale was legally
impossible.184 A deeper look into the Court’s rationale reveals the use of
faulty civilian logic to disguise a policy decision against mortgages on
movables, which is no longer relevant today.185 The Barber Asphalt Court
provided three basic rationales for why a conditional sale was legally
impossible: (1) the transaction did not fit the definition of a sale; (2) the
transaction did not fit the definition of a sale subject to a modality; and (3)
sales require a price to have been paid.186
1. Not a Sale
The Court began by attempting to classify the contract according to
the parties’ intent, and it determined that the intent of the parties was to
enter into a contract of sale, described in the Civil Code at that time as “an
agreement by which one gives a thing for a price in current money, and
the other gives the price to have the thing itself.”187 The Court also cited a
Code article describing a sale as perfect between the parties when there
exists “an agreement for the object and for the price.”188 Interpreting the
plain meaning of these Code articles, the Court should have concluded that
a sale had taken place because there was an agreement for the object and
price and that agreement stipulated that a thing was to be transferred and
a price was to be paid for the thing. The Court instead interpreted the
essential elements of a sale to be “[a] thing, the property in which is
transferred from the seller to the buyer; and a price in money paid or
promised.”189

183. See, e.g., Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 46 So. 193
(La. 1908); Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., 99 So. 403 (La. 1924).
184. See Barber Asphalt, 46 So. 193.
185. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3302 (2018).
186. Barber Asphalt, 46 So. 193.
187. Id. at 194 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 2439 (1908)).
188. Id. (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 2456 (1908)).
189. Id. at 196.
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The Civil Code has never stipulated that the thing must be
immediately transferred for a sale to occur.190 In Barber Asphalt, the Court
interpreted the statutory phrase “gives a thing” to mean an immediate
transfer, which is inconsistent with the Court’s previous interpretation of
the phrase “gives the price” to mean that the price can be transferred
immediately or merely promised.191 Based on the plain language of the
Code articles, if the transfer of the price can be promised, the transfer of
the thing also can be promised because where the law does not distinguish,
the courts must not distinguish.192 By disallowing the promise of the
transfer of the thing, the Court adds a requirement to a sale that does not
exist in the plain language of the articles and has never existed as a
principle of the civil law of sales.193 Transfer of title is an essential element
of any sale, but the time at which the ownership must pass is not defined
by the Code.194 Thus, delay in the transfer of title creates no barriers to
classifying this contract as a sale.
Furthermore, essential elements of contracts are best understood
through the contrast to natural and accidental elements, as explained by
Pothier.195 According to Pothier, essential elements are those things
without which a contract cannot exist.196 Natural elements are those things
that ordinarily are present in a contract but may be omitted by special
agreement; accidental elements are things for which the parties may
agree.197 In summary, “the law ‘imposes the essential elements, presumes
the natural, and authorizes the accidentals,’ while the will of the parties
consequently ‘respects the essential, accepts or refuses the natural, and
creates, by itself, the accidentals.’”198 When all the essential elements of a
sale are present, the effects of an absolute sale must follow whether the

190. A review of the relevant articles under the sales title of the Civil Code
show no such requirement. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2439 (2018); TOOLEYKNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:17.
191. See Barber Asphalt, 46 So. at 196.
192. Martin v. Bryan, 12 La. Ann. 722, 722 (La. 1857) (“[W]e cannot
distinguish where the law does not distinguish.”).
193. See Cruz, supra note 101, at 547.
194. See Levingston, supra note 100, at 596; Cruz, supra note 101, at 537.
195. Pothier is an 18th-century French jurist known for his study of Roman
law and influence on the drafters of the French Civil Code. POTHIER, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATION OR CONTRACTS 17−32 (William David Evans trans.,
1826). See Cruz, supra note 101, at 547.
196. See Cruz, supra note 101, at 547.
197. See id.
198. Id. (quoting JOSE MARIA MANRESA Y NAVARRO, 8 COMENTARIOS AL
CODIGO CIVIL ESPANOL 578 (1907)).
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parties intended them or not.199 Louisiana Civil Code article 2439 sets
forth the essential elements of a sale: “Sale is a contract whereby a person
transfers ownership of a thing to another for a price in money. The thing,
the price, and the consent of the parties are requirements for the perfection
of a sale” and, arguably, are the only essential elements.200 This Code
article provides the same content as Article 2439 of the Code of 1870,
which made even clearer the notion that these things were the only
essential elements of the sale by making the title of the Article “Sale
contract defined—Essentials.” Although the titles of articles are not law,
this title reveals that, at least traditionally, the Civil Code defined these
three things as the only essential elements of a sale.201 The Barber Asphalt
Court wrongfully considered a timing element—the immediate transfer of
ownership—as an essential element to a sale with no justification from the
Civil Code.202
Current Louisiana Civil Code article 2456 appears to provide
justification for the Barber Asphalt Court’s holding, as the article states
that ownership transfers whenever there is agreement on the thing and the
price is fixed.203 A complete analysis reveals, however, that this rule is
merely suppletive, or, as Pothier would say, a natural element, because the
moment at which ownership is transferred is not the essence of the contract
of sale—without which there is either no contract at all or a contract of
another description.204 The French equivalent to Article 2456 maintains
that the Article does not contain any precepts enacted for the preservation
of the public order; consequently, the parties may derogate from the
Article in their agreement.205 No reason exists to justify why parties could
not derogate from this Article through their contract.206
The Court in Barber Asphalt said conditional sales are impossible
under civil law principles governing sales. The idea of retention of title
does not originate in the Code Napoleon or the Civil Codes of Spain or

199. Thomas v. Philip Werlein, 158 So. 635 (1935).
200. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2439 (2018). MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE
RIPERT, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, vol. 2, pt. 1 § 1358 (2d ed.1939).
201. Alain Levasseur, On the Structure of a Civil Code, 44 TUL. L. REV. 1073
(1988).
202. See Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 46 So. 193 (La. 1908).
203. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2456 (2018).
204. See Levingston, supra note 100, at 594; Cruz, supra note 101, at 537; see
also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1764 (1870).
205. LITVINOFF, supra note 70, § 65.
206. See Cruz, supra note 101, at 541; CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art.
1583 (Fr.).
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Louisiana.207 Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Cuba, however, all have
admitted that these types of sales are valid.208 These adaptations in other
civilian jurisdictions reveal that the Barber Asphalt Court was mistaken in
interpreting these contracts as impossible in a civilian system.209
Additionally, the Barber Asphalt Court also repudiated Baldwin, which
was persuasive prior jurisprudence establishing the possibility of a
conditional sale and without sufficient explanation repudiated the prior
holding.210
2. Not a Sale Subject to a Modality
Once the Barber Asphalt Court established that the contract was not a
sale unless ownership transferred, the Court addressed whether the
contract could be a sale under a suspensive condition and, again,
characterized this arrangement as legally impossible.211 The Court
correctly observed that contracts subject to a suspensive condition cannot
have effects until the condition is met.212 Because conditional sales are
intended to have effects prior to the occurrence of the condition, they
cannot possibly be sales under a suspensive condition.213 The Court,
however, failed to explore alternative modalities for this type of sale, such
as a term for performance.214
Planiol215 describes a sale as a contract whereby one person obligates
herself to transfer the ownership of a thing and another person obligates
herself to pay the value of the thing in money.216 As with any obligation,
the parties’ performances are due simultaneously unless one or both of
them have been granted a term for performance.217 Louisiana Civil Code
article 1778 states that
[a] term for the performance of an obligation is a period of time
207. Cruz, supra note 101, at 533.
208. Id. at 565−69.
209. See id.
210. See Baldwin v. Young, 17 So. 883 (La. 1895).
211. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 46 So. 193, 193−94,
196−97 (La. 1908).
212. Id. at 197.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 193.
215. Planiol is an early 20th-century scholar known as a major innovator of
French civil law. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 200, § 1353.
216. Id.
217. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 4:16, at 160;
LITVINOFF, supra note 70, § 14.
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either certain or uncertain. It is certain when it is fixed. It is
uncertain when it is not fixed but is determinable . . . . [W]hen it
is not determinable . . . the obligation must be performed within a
reasonable time.218
The payment of the price in the context of conditional sales must be a term
and not a condition because the obligation to pay is certain. Therefore,
deciding that a conditional sale is a sale subject to a term would have been
a reasonable rationale that would have undercut the logic of the option, but
the Court completely ignored that possibility.
3. Existence of Price
The Barber Asphalt Court’s final and most perplexing holding states,
“A price cannot be paid until there is a price; and there cannot be a price
until there is a sale . . . .”219 Suggesting that the sale must exist before the
price exists directly contradicts Louisiana Civil Code article 2439, which
describes a sale as “an agreement” to the thing and the price.220 According
to the plain language of the article, to have a sale, an agreed-upon price
must already exist.221 The Court attempted to make the existence of both
the sale and the price dependent on one another, but this circular argument
provides no actual guidance and muddles principles of code interpretation.
The Court’s mistaken characterization of a transfer of ownership as an
essential element of a sale made conditional sales impossible.222
Meanwhile, other civilian jurisdictions have recognized that transfer of
ownership is an essential effect, but not an essential element, of a sale.223
Upon close inspection, the Court likely was using this faulty civilian logic
as a disguise for a policy decision against creating a mortgage upon
movable property.224

218. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1778 (2018).
219. Barber Asphalt, 46 So. at 198.
220. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2439 (1908).
221. Barber Asphalt, 46 So. at 198.
222. Id.
223. See Cruz, supra note 101, at 559–69.
224. Until 1974, Louisiana did not allow mortgages on movables. LA. REV.
STAT. § 9:3302 (2018); see also Barber Asphalt, 46 So. at 196 (“A contract of
[this] kind is, as a matter of course, not possible under our law, since our law does
not recognize the validity of a mortgage on movables . . . .”); LITVINOFF, supra
note 70, § 68, at 104.
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4. Bond for Deed Exception
Without solving the underlying theoretical problems of Barber
Asphalt, the Trichel Court found bond for deed contracts possible under
Louisiana law simply because the object of the contract was immovable
property.225 The Trichel Court also construed the contracts in a way that
gave sellers all rights of ownership, except those which had been
abrogated by the parties via the contract, while the purchaser incurred
obligations but obtained almost no rights.226 The unsound rationale of the
Trichel Court and resulting solution is unsupported by Louisiana law. The
Court acknowledged that the true nature of this contract is a conditional
sale, which is impermissible under Louisiana law when selling immovable
property because immovable property must be transferred by a deed
translative of title.227 This distinction between movable and immovable
property has no merit under Louisiana law.228 Louisiana Civil Code article
2440 provides that “[a] sale . . . of an immovable must be made by
authentic act or by act under private signature, except as provided in
Article 1839.”229 Article 1839 states, “[A]n oral transfer is valid between
the parties when the property has been actually delivered and the transferor
recognizes the transfer when interrogated on oath.”230 When confronted
with verbal contracts of sale, courts have had no problem recognizing a
transfer of immovable property.231 Thus, parties to a conditional sale may
validly transfer ownership without the execution of a subsequent writing.
Furthermore, the classification of the contract as a contract to sell is
inaccurate. Bond for deed contracts are not contracts to sell because during
the interim period before ownership transfers the purchaser is entitled to
possession of the property and the seller is entitled to installment

225. See Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., 99 So. 403 (La. 1924).
226. See id.
227. See, e.g., St. Landry Loan Co. v. Etienne, 227 So. 2d 599 (La. Ct. App.
1969); Trichel, 99 So. 403. See Levingston, supra note 100, at 594.
228. Id.; see Cruz, supra note 101, at 537.
229. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2440 (2018).
230. Id. art. 1839.
231. See, e.g., Kinchen v. Redmond, 100 So. 607 (1924); LeBlanc v. Watson,
13 F.2d 76, 77 (5th Cir. 1926) (“A deed is merely the evidence of ownership, and
we do not understand that the Supreme Court of Louisiana meant to say that,
where property has been bought and paid for under a binding contract, nothing
short of a deed will make the purchaser owner.”); Rebman v. Reed, 335 So. 2d 37
(La. Ct. App. 1976), writ denied 338 So. 2d 699 (Lemmon, J., concurring) (stating
that the purpose of a writing requirement was to prevent misunderstanding of
verbal terms and was primarily evidentiary).
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payments, which is not the case in a typical contract to sell.232 Contracts to
sell are distinct from contracts of sale, and a bond for deed is significantly
more theoretically similar to a sale than to a contract to sell because of the
obligations incurred by the parties.233 In bond for deed contracts, the
parties are performing obligations that are typical of a sale, namely transfer
of possession from seller to buyer and payment of the price by the buyer.234
These obligations typically are never present in a contract to sell,
specifically because the obligations simply do not exist until the actual act
of sale.235 The existence of these obligations and the lack of other various
obligations typically existing in a contract to sell, such as a home
inspection or obtaining financing, make a bond for deed contract
theoretically more similar to a sale than a contract to sell. In every way but
the transfer of title, parties are acting like the sale is executed, and the law
should be able to enforce these contracts according to the parties’ intent.236
B. To Codify or Not to Codify?
Based on the preceding argument, bond for deed contracts are sales
contracts and should be recognized as such in the Civil Code. The Civil
Code undoubtedly recognizes liberty to contract, and the touchstone of
contract interpretation is the principle that “[i]nterpretation of a contract is
the determination of the common intent of the parties.”237 In a bond for
deed contract, the parties intend a contract of sale in which ownership is
transferred upon full payment of the price.238 Parties typically view these
agreements as financing options for the sale and maintain title only as
security for the underlying financial obligation.239 In a true bond for deed
232. Levingston, supra note 100, at 594. This period is colloquially referred to
as the “closing” period.
233. Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2467–2564, with arts. 2623–24.
234. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2944 (2018).
235. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2440, 2475.
236. Cruz, supra note 101, at 537; Levingston, supra note 100, at 594, 596.
237. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2045; Cruz, supra note 101, at 551−55.
238. Levingston, supra note 100, at 594 (citing Cruz, supra note 101, at 537).
239. See, e.g., Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Renting to Own
Gains Favor, and Risks Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2016, at A1; David J. Mitchell,
Ascension Assessor Mert ‘Smiley’ Campaigns on his Record While Challenger says
Constituents are Unhappy, ADVOCATE (Oct. 21, 2015, 4:17 AM), http://www
.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/communities/article_a657934d-c027-5fb9917e-d6379868c1f1.html [https://perma.cc/6Y95-557J]; Purpura, supra note 1. A
fraction of these parties potentially intend a lease with an option to purchase but
mistakenly create a bond for deed contract. A “[l]ease is a synallagmatic contract
by which one party, the lessor, binds himself to give to the other party, the lessee,
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contract, the Louisiana Legislature and the courts should consider the
intent of the parties, and the law of sales should apply.
Parties entering these types of contracts do so via escrow agencies or
without the assistance of counsel.240 Laypersons without a detailed
knowledge of sales law are not likely to anticipate every contingency for
which they should contract.241 This assumption is true for most contracts
of sale.242 To illustrate, when buying a used car from a friend, people
typically do not think to write out a contract that includes provisions for
undisclosed defects—redhibitory defects. These types of parties
unconsciously rely on supplemental rules of law to protect their
interests.243 The principal benefit of classifying the bond for deed as a sale
is that the classification provides the parties with a rich body of suppletive
laws that establish the rights and obligations of buyers and sellers.244
Sophisticated parties can always contract against this body of law that is
meant to protect unsophisticated buyers, but these suppletive laws are
particularly important in bond for deed contracts because parties entering
bond for deed contracts are usually both unsophisticated and
unrepresented.245 This dependency is the main reason why sales law has
such a large breadth of suppletive law and why sales law provides greater
protections for parties to bond for deed contracts.246
Although these contracts are sales, the fact that ownership does not
immediately transfer will require some additional rules specific to the
bond for deed contract. Occasional modifications to a civil code to account
the use and enjoyment of a thing for a term in exchange for a rent that the lessee
binds himself to pay.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2668. A contract for lease may
include an option to buy, which is “a contract whereby a party gives to another the
right to accept an offer to sell . . . a thing within a stipulated time.” LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2620. A bond for deed is similar to a lease with an option to purchase
because both include an obligor (1) obtaining possession of the immovable; (2)
paying money in defined increments to the obligee; and (3) eventually completing
a contract of sale. Historically, courts have not had a problem differentiating bond
for deed contracts from lease contracts with an option to purchase and subsequently
applying appropriate law. See, e.g., Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. Pine Tree
Amusement Co., 156 So. 812, 813 (La. 1934); Bohanon v. Stewart, 4 La. App. 150,
153 (1926); H.J. Bergeron, Inc. v. Parker, 964 So. 2d 1075, 1076 (La. Ct. App.
2007); Upton v. Whitehead, 935 So. 2d 746, 748 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
240. See infra Appendix B.
241. Fuller, supra note 104.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2438–2630.
245. See supra note 244.
246. See supra note 244.
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for new types of contracts are expected.247 Scholars agree that
“[r]ecognizing the advantages of codification and trying to avoid its
defects where possible, the framers of the codes now in force always left
‘an open door’ for the new situations that might arise, but which could not
be predicted when the code was written.”248 These types of sales were not
explicitly provided for in Louisiana’s original code articles because people
did not commonly use them in the early 19th century, but today, these
contracts are so common that legislative progress must be made, and the
Code must speak to them.249
By enacting the 1934 Bond for Deed Act, the Legislature understood
the need for special rules dictating bond for deed contracts, but the
construction of the Act and its inaccurate classification do not allow courts
to appropriately enforce bond for deed contracts as the parties intended.250
The 1994 Louisiana State Law Institute’s proposal for revisions to the
Bond for Deed Act drafted by Professor Saúl Litvinoff 251 illuminates the
idea that when creating a body of law to govern these contracts, the
Legislature must consider public policy as well as the intent of the parties
typically partaking in these types of contracts.252 As a result, the unhelpful
Bond for Deed Act should be replaced with a new Civil Code title on bond
for deed and all of the general sales provisions should apply to these
contracts, in addition to some particular rules of the bond for deed title.
The new bond for deed articles would explain the nature of these contracts
and how they are used when mortgaged immovable property is involved
and will import the spirit of the Law Institute’s 1994 proposal to the
Louisiana Legislature.253 Such a fundamental principle—whether a
contract constitutes a sale—is a subject better suited for the Civil Code
than the Revised Statutes.254 Integration into the Code, as opposed to the
Louisiana Revised Statutes, will allow these rules to be interpreted along
with the Code as a whole and contribute to a comprehensive understanding
of civilian principles.255

247. See Levasseur, supra note 201.
248. Cruz, supra note 101, at 541.
249. Id.
250. See Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., 99 So. 403 (La. 1924).
251. The late Professor Litivinoff was a Professor Emeritus and Boyd
Professor of Law at the Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center.
252. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Levasseur, supra note 201.
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C. Sales Solutions
Transferring the legislative regime from the Bond for Deed Act to the
Civil Code presents minor challenges but is a simple solution overall. Two
main provisions establishing the contract as a sale would be necessary.
These provisions would exist either as a chapter under the sales title or as
a separate title, and the first provision would provide a simple definition
of a bond for deed contract. The article could provide simply, “A sale of
an immovable in which the parties agree that the transfer of ownership is
delayed until all or a part of the price is paid is enforceable according to
the intention of the parties.” Additionally, a Code article similar to Articles
2659 and 2664, which provide that the giving in payment and the exchange
are, respectively, governed by the sales title, will be necessary. Tracking
the language of those articles, the new article could provide, “The bond
for deed contract is governed by the rules of the contract of sale, with
differences provided for in this chapter/title.”256 After these additions, the
protections found in the Bond for Deed Act regarding encumbered
property would remain merely translated into a form better suited for the
Civil Code. This section explores some of the most helpful provisions of
sales law that will be implemented into bond for deed contracts, as well as
the necessary additions to the code.
1. Sales Law
Sales law involves such a range of protective suppletive provisions
that explaining all the possible solutions flowing from application of the
suppletive sales law is beyond the scope of this Comment, which instead
addresses a few major provisions that would be especially useful in the
context of bond for deed contracts: the seller’s obligations to deliver; to
warrant against redhibitory defect; and to warrant against eviction.257
a. Delivery
The seller’s obligation to deliver the thing sold is a fundamental
obligation to the contract of sale.258 Article 2485 provides that
when the seller fails to deliver or to make timely delivery of the
thing sold, the buyer may demand specific performance of the
obligation of the seller to deliver, or may seek dissolution of the
256. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2659, 2664 (2018).
257. Fuller, supra note 104.
258. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2485.
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sale. In either case, and also when the seller has made a late
delivery, the buyer may seek damages.
Effective delivery that discharges any liability of the seller is
accomplished in the correct manner, on time, and at the proper place.259 The
correct manner, time, and place will vary based on whether the thing sold is
movable or immovable.260 Article 2477 provides that delivery of an
immovable is deemed to take place upon execution of the writing that
transfers its ownership.261 Technically, delivery occurs contemporaneously
with the execution of the act of sale, and at the moment of delivery, the buyer
is entitled to immediate corporeal possession.262 Although, theoretically,
one could argue for a slight delay in relinquishing corporeal possession in
circumstances in which the seller is prevented from timely vacating, courts
will not allow delay in cases in which the parties’ agreement explicitly calls
for possession at the time of the sale.263 If the seller is unable to deliver
corporeal possession of the property at the time of the sale, the parties should
enter into a delayed occupancy agreement that will specify how long the
seller may stay on the property and provide compensation to the buyer for
the continued right of occupancy.
Not only must delivery occur immediately, but the seller must also
deliver a thing or things to the buyer that conform to the contract.264 In
sales of immovables, there are specific rules related to delivery of the full
“extent of the immovable.”265 In the event that the full extent of the
premises is not delivered, there are specific remedies available depending
on the type of sale and the actual extent of the premises that are missing.266
These remedies are mandatory for sales but do not apply to other
transactions. First, if the sale is a sale by measure—that is, a sale made
259. Id. art. 2477.
260. Lanier Bus. Prods., Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Rayville, 388 So. 2d 442,
445 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (applying the rule that delivery of movables must be made
in a “reasonable” time); Matthews v. Gaubler, 49 So. 2d 774, 777 (La. Ct. App.
1951) (applying the rule that delivery of immovables occur at the time of
execution of the act of sale).
261. Art. 2477.
262. Matthews, 49 So. 2d 774.
263. Id.
264. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2489 (providing that the seller must deliver the
thing sold in the condition that, at the time of the sale, the parties expected, or
should have expected, the thing to be in at the time of delivery, according to its
nature). Id. art. 2461.
265. Id. art. 2491 (“The seller must deliver to the buyer the full extent of the
immovable sold.”).
266. Id. arts. 2492, 2494–95.
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with an indication of the extent of the premises at a rate of so much per
measure—Article 2492 provides that if the amount delivered is less than
promised, the buyer gets a proportionate reduction in the price.267 If the
amount delivered is more than promised, the buyer must pay a
proportionate supplement, but if the extent delivered exceeds by more than
1/20 the extent specified in the contract, the buyer can recede from the
contract.268
Second, if the sale is a sale made with an indication of the extent of
the premises at a lump price, Article 2424 provides that no reduction or
supplement is allowed unless there is a surplus or a shortage of more than
1/20 the extent specified in the contract.269 If there is a surplus that gives
the seller the right to increase the price, then the buyer can recede—instead
of paying a supplement—at his option.270 Lastly, if the sale is a sale of a
certain and limited body or of a distinct object for a lump price, it is a sale
per aversionem.271 Article 2495 provides that there is no recovery of any
kind in this type of contract because it is presumed that both seller and
purchaser intended to contract with reference to the boundaries, rather than
with reference to the quantity, length, or depth of the property.272 All of
the supplemental provisions regarding the seller’s obligation to deliver
apply to every sale and protect the parties while maintaining the basic
obligations. If a bond for deed contract is classified as a sale, these laws
apply to protect buyers and sellers alike.
b. Redhibition
The seller’s obligation to warrant against redhibitory defects is a
unique buyer protection found only in Louisiana law, which builds upon
the Roman idea that a person cannot sell something that is defective, and
stands in opposition to the common law idea of caveat emptor, or “let the
buyer beware.”273 Article 2520 provides that
[a] defect is redhibitory when it renders the thing useless, or . . . so
inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not have
bought the thing had he known of the defect. The existence of such
267. Art. 2492.
268. Id. Note that this right to rescission does not apply to shortages.
269. Art. 2494.
270. Id. Note that the right of rescission does not apply to shortages.
271. Art. 2495.
272. See id.
273. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 23, § 11:47; Caveat,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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a defect gives the buyer the right to obtain rescission of the sale.274
Importantly, redhibitory defects only allow rescission of sales.275
The Civil Code classifies redhibitory defects by their remedy. When
the defect is such that it renders the thing useless or so inconvenient that it
must be presumed that the buyer would not have bought the thing, then the
defect justifies complete rescission of the contract of sale.276 When the
defect is such that it diminishes the usefulness or value of the thing such
that it must be presumed that the buyer would still have bought, but for a
lesser price, the defect justifies quanti minoris, or a reduction of the
price.277
A common example of a redhibitory defect in immovable property is
a house with a termite infestation that was not discovered after reasonable
inspection.278 In a sale of such a house, the buyer could demand rescission
or reduction of the price.279 If, however, that same buyer opted to finance
the sale through a bond for deed agreement as opposed to a typical
mortgage, the buyer would have no recourse and would be subject to only
the terms of the contract and suppletive contract law.280 Classifying bond
for deed as a sale in the Code would grant this buyer access to judicial
remedies not currently found in the Bond for Deed Act, such as recovery
for redhibitory defects.281

274. The full text of Louisiana Civil Code article 2520 states,
The seller warrants the buyer against redhibitory defects, or vices, in the
thing sold. A defect is redhibitory when it renders the thing useless, or
its use so inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not
have bought the thing had he known of the defect. The existence of such
a defect gives a buyer the right to obtain rescission of the sale. A defect
is redhibitory also when, without rendering the thing totally useless, it
diminishes its usefulness or its value so that it must be presumed that a
buyer would still have bought it but for a lesser price. The existence of
such a defect limits the right of a buyer to a reduction of the price.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Popiwchak, 677 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
279. Art. 2520.
280. Id. art. 1915.
281. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:2941–49 (2018).
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c. Eviction
The seller’s obligation to warrant against eviction is also a
fundamental effect to any contract of sale.282 Article 2500 defines eviction
as the buyer’s loss of, or danger of losing, the whole or part of the thing
sold because of the third person’s right that existed at the time of the
sale.283 This warranty does not protect against physical dispossession but
a third person’s legal right; therefore, a trespasser can never evict an owner
because trespassers do not have a lawful claim to the property.284 Loss of
the thing occurs when a third party’s superior right to the thing is judicially
decreed, making the buyer no longer the full owner.285 The buyer
experiences a danger of loss when the buyer can show that a third person
has perfect title to the thing.286 Under a full warranty sale, an evicted buyer
may demand rescission, withhold the price, and demand damages and
reimbursements for any fruits or improvements to the property.287
As Professor Litvinoff observed, the rules governing eviction in the
law of sales provide rules of “unquestionable fairness” for the buyer, and
their application protects a buyer from loss of the immovable because of
undetected defects in the chain of title evidencing a third person’s superior
rights that existed at the time of contracting.288 Typically, a warranty
against eviction is implied in every sale, but unless bond for deed contracts
are recognized as sales, courts are not likely to apply eviction articles
without legislative instruction.289 Application of the law of eviction
entitles the purchaser to restitution of the price, restitution of fruits and
revenues, all costs occasioned by the lawsuit concerning the eviction, and,
sometimes, damages.290 Application of the law of eviction, redhibition,
and the seller’s obligation to deliver in sales is necessary to protect
unsophisticated purchasers and should apply to purchasers in bond for
deed contracts as well.291
282. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2500.
283. Id.
284. See id.; see also Blanchard v. Norman-Breaux Lumber Co., 44 So. 2d 112
(1949).
285. See art. 2500 cmt. b.
286. See id. cmt. a.
287. See id. arts. 2506, 2507, 2509.
288. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127, at 13. See Art. 2500.
289. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2503.
290. See id. art. 2506.
291. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127, at 13.
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2. Solutions Particular to Bonds for Deed
Although sales law solves many issues with bond for deed contracts,
because of the muddled jurisprudential history of these contracts in
Louisiana, a few additional codal provisions under the bond for deed title
of the Civil Code could provide guidance to courts and attorneys. These
additions would import the most helpful provisions of the Bond for Deed
Act, as well as add provisions inspired by the final proposal by the Law
Institute Bond for Deed committee.292
The Code must establish that a purchaser in a bond for deed contract
acquires a real right in the immovable effective against third parties by
registry.293 The original Bond for Deed Act and its treatment by
jurisprudence suggests that a real right is created by the requirement of
recordation, but recordation alone does not create a real right.294 In a bond
for deed contract the parties contemplate a transfer of ownership, the
ultimate real right.295 Therefore, the Legislature and the courts should
acknowledge that the purchaser has much more than the undefined interest
in the property that the courts currently recognize.296 This proposed
revision clarifies the law and lays a framework through which courts can
analyze the legal issues as opposed to the old statute, which mainly
provided for the effect of the contract without laying the appropriate
civilian framework.297
Additionally, the law should provide that a purchaser has the rights
and obligations of an owner from the time the agreement is created,
although ownership is not acquired until the price is paid.298 A provision
of this type would be a completely new addition to bond for deed law and
would once again provide the framework through which the courts can
analyze and apply these contracts in a way that makes both the intent of

292. Id.
293. Id. at 5. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2942 (2018) (suggesting a real
right is acquired by virtue of recordation).
294. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2941.1; Levine v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce,
948 So. 2d 1051 (2006). Compare Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., 99 So. 403, 404 (La.
1924) (finding an interest was not transferred), with Levine, 948 So. 2d at 1058–
59 (finding an interest definitely was transferred and hinting that a right had been
transferred). See Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach,
supra note 127, at 5.
295. See supra note 293.
296. See Levine, 948 So. 2d 1051.
297. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127, at 5.
298. Id.
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the parties and the intent of the Legislature effective.299 Because a transfer
of ownership is the ultimate goal in these agreements and parties
contemplate that the purchaser will become owner, the default rule would
give effect to the purpose of bond for deed contracts.300 Moreover, as
future owner, the purchaser arguably has the greatest interest in caring for
the property under a bond for deed contract. Therefore, it follows that the
responsibility to maintain the property should belong to the purchaser.
Providing the purchaser with the rights and obligations of an owner
throughout the duration of the contract would solve certain problems, such
as making the purchaser liable in tort for harm caused by the property. 301
This application is consistent with the purpose of tort law: to hold at fault
parties responsible.302 It follows that when harm is caused by the property,
the party at fault would be the party who has possession of the property
and is responsible for repair and upkeep.303 Moreover, the purchaser would
be responsible for taxes and insurance, a responsibility that is already
conferred in practice under most bond for deed contracts.304 Most
importantly, the purchaser would bear the risk of loss of the property in
these situations.305 Courts generally maintain that the risk of loss follows
ownership and forces the seller to assume this risk, but courts treating the
purchaser as the owner for purposes of tort, insurance payments, and
taxes—but not risk of loss—would be inconsistent.306 Furthermore,
because the purchaser has the most to gain from the contract, namely right
of ownership to the immovable, the purchaser should bear the risk of loss
as well.307 This liability provides another incentive to purchasers to care
for and keep up the value of the property, as well as allowing the purchaser
to make improvements to the property.308
Mortgages encumber many properties sold under a bond for deed
contract. The law protects mortgagees by requiring notification before

299. See id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2018).
303. If sellers are not allowed onto the property, then they have no control over the
property, and therefore they have no duty of care to maintain the safety of the property.
304. See infra Appendix B.
305. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127, at 5.
306. See Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., 99 So. 403 (La. 1924).
307. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127, at 5.
308. Id.
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entering into bond for deed contracts.309 This requirement incentivizes
mortgagees to continue their business and aids in keeping properties in
commerce.310 When owners sell their mortgaged property, the mortgagee
typically requires notification because mortgagees have an interest in
knowing who has possession of the property, the purchaser’s ability to pay,
and whether the purchaser will continue with upkeep and repairs of the
encumbered property.311 The law should continue to incentivize mortgagees
to allow bond for deed contracts by requiring notification when an owner
attempts to sell through a bond for deed contract.312 Moreover, protection of
buyers demands that failure to comply with the notice requirement will
make the seller liable for any damages sustained by the buyer as a result
of the failure.313
One of the most important additions must establish that timely
payment by the purchaser to the escrow agent of the amount due under the
bond for deed contract must preclude foreclosure for the nonpayment by a
mortgagee who provides written consent to the bond for deed.314 This right
is reflected in the Bond for Deed Act and must remain as a policy matter.315
When purchasers enter into this type of agreement, they expect the right
to possess for as long as they have fulfilled their obligations under the
contract.316 Although this rule initially seems to disadvantage mortgagees,
holders of mortgages typically are highly sophisticated parties and
purchasers are not. Also, mortgagees must consent to the bond for deed
contract to be held to this provision.317 Therefore, mortgagees are not put
at any real disadvantage by the law, and the purchasers are protected.318
As a complement to the foreclosure preclusion, the law should provide
additional options for the purchaser in the event of seller default on the
309. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2942 (2018).
310. See, e.g., Act No. 169, 1934 La. Acts 544; Meeting of the Council for the
Louisiana State Law Institute (Dec. 17−18, 1993) (on file with the Louisiana State
Law Institute).
311. See, e.g., Levine v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 948 So. 2d 1051,
1054–55 (La. 2006).
312. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127.
313. Id.
314. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2944.
315. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127; Meeting of the Council for the Louisiana State Law Institute (Sept. 16,
1994) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
316. See § 9:2944.
317. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127.
318. See § 9:2944.
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mortgage and express options that the current statute lacks.319 When the
seller fails to make mortgage payments due in excess of the amount owed
by the purchaser under the bond for deed contract, the Code should allow
for the purchaser either to pay the delinquent installments to the mortgagee
and deduct the sum paid from the debt owed to the seller or recede from
the contract.320 Should the purchaser choose to recede, dissolution may be
effected by a written notice to the seller declaring the contract dissolved
and the reasons for doing so.321 In a situation in which the purchasers
recede, if they provided some sort of down payment or if the cost of the
payments is more than fair rental value of the property, they would be
entitled to damages under the Code’s damages articles amounting in the
return of those payments.322 Similarly, if the escrow agent fails to make
payments to the mortgagee, then the purchaser should have a right to pay
the delinquent installments and deduct the sums paid from the debt owed
to the seller.323
Professor Litvinoff argued that provisions of this type essentially import
the principles found in Article 2694 of the lease title in which a lessee may
make repairs that are the responsibility of the lessor and then either demand
reimbursement or deduct the amount paid from the rent owed to the
lessor.324 The purpose behind both rules is to allow those persons in
possession of an immovable to protect their interest in the immovable—or
in a bond for deed contract their right in the immovable—at the expense of
the true owner.325 This provision provides mortgagees with slightly more
protection because the rule clarifies that the purchaser is allowed to pay on

319. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127. See § 9:2944.
320. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127.
321. Id.
322. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1994−2004 (2018).
323. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127.
324. Id.; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2694 (“If the lessor fails to perform his
obligation to make necessary repairs within a reasonable time after demand by the
lessee, the lessee may cause them to be made. The lessee may demand immediate
reimbursement of the amount expended for the repair or apply that amount to the
payment of rent, but only to the extent that the repair was necessary and the
expended amount was reasonable.”).
325. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127, at 11−12; see Lake Forest, Inc. v. Katz & Besthoff No. 9, Inc., 391 So.
2d 1286 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
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behalf of the seller in the case of default.326 The provision also affords
purchasers with options and extra protection by clarifying that they can
deduct these costs from the total amount due to the seller.327
Finally, implementing these proposed revisions would have the
unexpected effect of keeping Murray out of jail.328 Under this new regime,
Murray would have had the right to dispose of the appliances because she
indisputably possesses the right to act as the owner of the property. Then,
after dissolution of the contract, Murray would only be liable for damages
to Leverett under the Civil Code articles regulating damages, as opposed
to facing criminal sanctions.329
CONCLUSION
The current confusion that clouds bond for deed law results from
problematic jurisprudence that makes these agreements incompatible with
the Civil Code. With a few revisions classifying these contracts as sales,
bond for deed contracts can continue to be used throughout Louisiana and
be trusted by sellers, purchasers, and mortgagees. These agreements do
not conflict with civilian notions of sales, and with a few adjustments to
clarify the rights of purchasers and mortgagees, these agreements can
become a useful and beneficial part of Louisiana real estate transactions.

Endya L. Hash

326. Final Draft Bond for Deed Revised Contract for Sale Approach, supra
note 127.
327. Id.
328. See Purpura, supra note 1.
329. Id.
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APPENDIX A: FORM CONTRACTS
Form A
The following is a copy of the language used in Form A:
THIS IS A MEMORANDUM OF THAT CERTAIN BOND FOR
DEED executed this same date before the undersigned Notary Public, by
and between _________ (hereinafter “owner” which term shall denote
either singular or plural) and the undersigned “Purchaser”, in order to
effect property registry and give notice thereof pursuant to Louisiana Law,
La. R.S. 9:2721, et seq, to the effect that Owner will sell and Purchaser
will purchase the following described immovable property:
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION
The Purchase Price is $________, and said Bond for Deed is fully
incorporated herein by reference, and made a part of hereof as though set
forth in full herein or annexed hereto. It is the intention of the parties hereto
to hereby ratify, approve and confirm the Bond for Deed as a matter of
public notice and record, and nothing herein shall in any way affect or
modify the terms and conditions of the referenced Bond for Deed, a
summary of which is as follows:
SPECIAL MORTGAGE: In conformity with La. Civil Code Art.
3294, Owner hereby grants to ________, Mortgagee, a Special Mortgage
on the property located in the State of Louisiana, Parish of East Baton
Rouge as described above.
executed between the parties. The maximum amount secured by this
mortgage is Five Hundred Thousand Dollars. The actual amount of the
indebtedness shall be determined by the outstanding fees due Escrow
Services, Inc., as well as the amount of damages sustained by the
mortgagee as a result of the breach, by Owner, of the obligations set forth
in said agreement.
CANCELLATION: It is hereby stipulated that Escrow Services, Inc.
Shall be authorized to file for record a cancellation of this Bond for Deed
and Special Mortgage upon which all interested persons may rely, should
payment records show default or expiration of Bond for Deed or breach of
other obligations, as determined in the sole discretion of Escrow Services,
Inc.
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ESCROW AGENT: Owner and Purchaser, including their successors
and/or assigns, have appointed Escrow Services, Inc., 450 Causeway, Ste,
B, Mandeville, LA 70448 as Escrow Agent for the Bond for Deed.
USUFRUCT: Owner hereby grants a usufruct in favor of Purchaser
over the property subject to this agreement. Said usufruct is for the benefit
of Louisiana Homestead Exemption and shall automatically terminate
upon cancellation of this agreement.
POWER OF ATTORNEY: Owner further declares and acknowledges
that Owner has made and appointed Escrow Services, Inc., to be their true
and lawful agent and attorney-in-fact, giving and by these presents,
granting unto the said agent, full power and authority to act for Owner, in
Owner’s name and on Owner’s behalf, to sell and deliver the hereinabove
described real estate and all of owner’s rights, title and interest therein,
with warranty of title and with subrogation of all actions of warranty, unto
any person, firm, corporation or association, in accordance with the terms
of the Bond for Deed and to receive the balance, if any, due at such time.
Owner further acknowledges that it has authorized the said agent and
attorney-in-fact, in agent’s sole and unconditional discretion, to sign all
papers, document and acts necessary to accomplish the above purposes
and to do any and all things which the said agent deems necessary or
property in connection therewith.
This Power of Attorney is intended to be effective for an indefinite
duration, for which any party may rely, until a revocation thereof is filed
in the conveyance records where this Power of Attorney is recorded.
THUS DONE AND PASSED, in counterpart on this date, in the
presence of two undersigned competent witnesses, who hereunto sign their
names together with Owner and Purchaser, and me, Notary, after reading
of the whole.
Form B
The following is a copy of the language used in Form B:
BE IT KNOWN, that on this ______________ day of ____________
A.D. 20___, before me, the undersigned Notary Public duly commissioned
and qualified in and for the State and Parish aforesaid, and in the presence
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of the competent witnesses hereinafter named and undersigned,
PERSONALLY CAME AND APPEARED:
_________________________________
(Hereinafter called “Seller”)
AND
________________________________
(Hereinafter called “Purchaser”)
Collectively the Seller and Purchaser are hereinafter referred to as
“Appearers”.
Appearers declare that this Contract is a Bond for Deed with each
other to the effect that Seller will sell land; Purchaser will purchase the
immovable property as hereinafter described with any and all
improvements situated thereon.
NOW IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT
THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT A SALE, TRANSFER OR CONVEYANCE
BUT ONLY A WRITTEN AGREEMENT TO SELL, TRANSFER AND
CONVEY THE HEREIN DESCRIBED PROPERTY IN THE FUTURE
PROVIDED ALL OF THE TERMS, CONDITIONS, PAYMENTS AND
OBLIGATIONS SET FORTH HEREIN ARE FULLY, COMPLETELY
AND TIMELY MET BY PURCHASER.
TERMS OF SALE: Appearers further declare that contemporaneously
with the final payment, a sale is to be executed by the said Seller in favor
of the said Purchaser in the standard form for a Louisiana cash sale with
full warranty of title. The cost of all necessary certificates and vendor’s
fee shall be paid by Seller and all notarial fees and other expenses shall be
paid by Purchaser.
PROPERTY: If, and only if, Purchaser makes all payments prescribed
herein and promptly pays all tax assessments and insurance as set forth
hereinafter. Seller will at that time execute a sufficient warranty deed,
selling and conveying unto Purchaser the following described real
property, to wit:
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION
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The said property is subject to any and all restrictions, conditions and
servitudes that may appear in the records of
____________________________.
CERTIFICATES: Appearers take cognizance of the fact that no
survey, nor title examination has been made on the herein described
property examination has been made on the herein described property in
connection with this Act, and Appearers do hereby relieve and release me,
Notary, from any and all liability in connections with encroachment which
might appear on such survey and title defects which might have been
disclosed by such title examination.
PUBLIC RECORDS: This Bond for Deed will be recorded in the
mortgage and conveyance records of the Parish where the Property is
located.
PURCHASE PRICE: The total purchase price for the property and any
improvements thereon shall be the sum of
_______________________________________ ($_____________)
DOLLARS.
Appearers declared that contemporaneously with the execution of this
instrument, Purchaser has paid to Seller the sum of
_______________________________________ ($_____________)
DOLLARS,
cash in hand paid, the receipt whereof and the sufficiency thereof is
hereby acknowledged, and Purchaser does hereby bind assigns, to pay
unto Seller the additional sum of
_______________________________________ ($_____________)
DOLLARS,
with interest at the rate of _______% per annum on the unpaid
principal balance, payable as follows:
PAYMENTS: Said payments are to be made beginning
_______________, 20__, and on the same day of each succeeding month
thereafter until the full principal sum has been paid. All payments are to
be made to Seller, or to any banking or savings institution designated by
Seller. If such an institution is designated, the Purchaser will pay the
collection fees required.
ACCELERATION: Seller may require immediate payment in full of
all sums if:
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1. Within any consecutive twelve-month period Purchaser defaults by
failing to pay in full any two monthly payments within 30 days of the due
date; OR,
2. Purchaser defaults by failing to pay in full any principal payment
required by this Bond for Deed Contract within 30 days of the due date;
OR
3. Purchaser defaults by failing, for a period of thirty days after notice,
to perform any other obligations contained in this Bond for Deed contract.
WARRANTY: Seller further declares and warrants that the property
is not subject to any liens or encumbrances whatsoever and has not been
alienated since its acquisition of the same and transferred to the said
Purchaser, execute or permit any mortgages, liens or encumbrances to be
placed on the said property and will at the time that the title is transferred,
clear any inscriptions appearing on the Mortgage and conveyance
Certificates.
Further, the parties acknowledge that this contract is binding and
heritable upon the heirs and assigns of all parties. In the event that the
Purchaser must take legal action to cure any title defect, cancel any lien or
encumbrance or other wise incur legal expenses to ensure transfer of the
property (e.g. open succession in the event of the seller’s death) those
expenses, including attorneys’ fees, will be paid by the Seller.
TAX DEDUCTION: The interest paid by the Purchaser shall be
deductible on the income tax return of Purchaser as allowed by IRS.
WAIVER: Purchaser expressly consents to a waiver of the
requirement of Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2943 that a Louisiana bank be
designated as “Escrow” Agent. Seller and Purchaser expressly waive any
right that they may have to claim the invalidity of this Bond for Deed
Contract because of the noncompliance with the said statute and all parties
agree not to initiate or suggest that any action be taken against Seller under
R.S. 9:2947. Purchaser further understands that the said statutes are the
Purchaser’s protection.
SPECIAL MORTGAGE: In order to secure the full and faithful
performance of the foregoing obligation of Seller to deliver title to the
above described property, Seller does by these presents further specially
mortgage and hypothecate the hereinabove property unto and in favor of
Purchaser and Purchaser’s successors and assigns.
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The amount of this special mortgage is equal to the sum of all
payments, including but not limited to interest, principal, insurance
premiums, taxes, escrow or collection fees, the expenses of maintenance
and repairs, and all other payments permitted and/or required by this
contract, including reasonable attorney’s fees, paid by the Purchaser. This
special mortgage shall also secure the loss value to Purchaser, which loss
of value is defined to be the difference between the principal purchase
price and the market value of the property at the time of foreclosure of this
property. The maximum amount of the obligation secured by this special
mortgage shall be three (3) times the purchase price.
REPAIRS AND OCCUPANCY: Purchaser is hereby granted the
immediate right of exclusive occupancy of the herein described property
and agrees to keep the property in good repair, to repair and maintain the
improvements, and assume all risk of loss and destruction of said
improvements. Purchaser agrees to keep the subject property covered
under a termite contract with licensed and bonded pest control contractor.
NO LIENS OR PRIVILEGES: No person shall be entitled to a lien or
privilege on the immovable property described hereinabove, nor a claim
against Seller as owner, under R.S. 9:4801 or R.S. 9:4802 unless Seller
shall have specifically agreed in writing to the price and work of any
undertaking by Purchaser or any other Person.
TAXES: All taxes assessed against the herein described property up
to and including the tax year 20__ have been paid. Taxes for the tax year
20__ have been prorated through the date hereof. All property taxes, any
state, local or other assessments, from the date of this Act and thereafter
shall be the responsibility of Purchaser, and will be promptly paid by
Purchaser when due, prior to the time the same become delinquent.
INSURANCE: Purchaser further agrees to carry, at Purchaser's
expense, fire and extended coverage (minimum $
personal liability)
insurance and flood insurance in the minimum amount required. All
necessary insurance policies to protect all parties to be in the names of the
respective parties, Seller and Purchaser, as required. Certificates of such
insurance shall be delivered to Seller at the time of execution of this
agreement. It is understood and agreed that all insurance proceeds that
might be paid under said insurance policies will be distributed between
Seller and Purchaser as their respective interest may exist at the time of
the payment of such insurance proceeds. If the existing insurance is
continued, Purchaser agrees to review coverage to ascertain the suitability.
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DEFAULT: Appearers further declare that the payment of each
installment, plus the payment of all taxes, and any state, local or other
assessments and insurance premiums is of the essence of this agreement
and that if any of the said installments, taxes, assessments or insurance
premiums are not paid when due or if Purchaser shall in any other manner
violate the covenants hereunder, them in any of such events, Purchaser
shall be in default and Seller shall have the right, at Seller's option:
1. To seek specific performance of this Agreement, and to accelerate
all installments due for the unexpired term of this Agreement, and declare
said amount immediately due and payable, together with an attorney's fee
of 20% of the total amount due by Purchaser in the event an attorney is
employed to protect any interest or enforce any rights of Seller under this
Agreement. Upon payment of all such amounts Seller will immediately
convey title to the herein described property to Purchaser. Purchaser
expressly waives demand and all notices of demand; OR
2. To have this Agreement and the Special Mortgage granted
hereinabove canceled in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 2945 and
Civil Code Art. 2017, without the necessity of a judicial dissolution. It is
expressly agreed that Seller may serve the required forty-five day notice.
Purchaser expressly waives any additional time in which to perform that
may be allowed by Louisiana Civil Code Art. 2013. In such event all of
Purchaser's rights under this Agreement shall be forfeited as hereinafter
provided.
FORFEITURE: in the event of such default and cancellation under
R.S. 9:2945, the title to the above described property shall be free and clear
from any and all claims by Purchaser, and Seller shall be entitled to retain
all payments heretofore made by Purchaser and all improvements placed
upon-the said premises without reimbursing Purchaser therefor.
It is expressly agreed and stipulated that the initial payment, plus the
total installments paid by Purchaser, constitute the stipulated
compensatory amount and/or liquidated damages which Seller is entitled
to retain to fairly compensate Seller for: (1) the fair and reasonable rental
value of the property involved herein which is owed to Seller for
Purchaser's use of the property during the term of this Agreement, (2)
reasonable compensation owed to Seller for Seller's removal of the said
property from the market, and the resultant loss of all opportunities to sell
the subject property to a third party during the term of this agreement, (3)
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reimbursement of real estate broker's commission, closing fees and costs,
taxes, fees and Federal and State incomes taxes paid or incurred by Seller
as a result of this Agreement.
Further, Purchaser covenants and agrees that they and all persons
holding possession of the property described herein shall immediately
surrender said property and the improvements thereon to Seller upon
cancellation of this Agreement.
NO WAIVER: Seller's failure to strictly and promptly enforce his
rights under this Agreement shall NOT operate as a waiver of Seller's
rights, and said Seller hereby expressly reserves the right to always enforce
prompt payment of all installments during the entire term of this
Agreement, or to seek cancellation of this Agreement and forfeiture of all
payments to day of such cancellation, regardless of any indulgences or
extensions previously grant.
COMPLIANCE: Each party agrees to comply with the reasonable
requirements of the taxing and policing authorities having dominion over
the property. Seller agrees to take no act which renders performance
impossible by the Purchaser and to take all reasonable measures to permit
Purchaser to satisfy Purchaser's obligations.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in my notarial offices at on the day,
month and year first written at the beginning of this Agreement in the
presence of _______________ and ______________________, lawful
and competent witnesses, who herewith sign their names with the
Appearers, and me, Notary, after due reading of the whole.
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY OF CONTRACTS
Survey of Contract Forms
Form A

Form B

Original
Form

2016

23.8%

66.7%

9.5%

2015

17.6%

74.5%

7.8%

2014

17.8%

75.5%

6.7%

Responsibilities For Duration of the Contract (Contracts Filed in 2016)

Paying Taxes
Paying
Insurance
Premiums
Repairs
Risk of Loss of
Improvements
Upkeep

Purchaser

Seller

Silent

58.8%

5.9%

35.3%

58.8%

5.9%

35.3%

29.4%

0.0%

70.6%

58.8%

0.0%

41.2%

58.8%

0.0%

41.2%

Inclusion of Provisions (Contracts Filed in 2016)
Defining Default

70.6%

Defining Damages

47.1%

